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SHA1 algorithm securing e-commerce and
 software could break by year’s end
Researchers warn widely used algorithm should be retired sooner.
SHA1, one of the Internet's most crucial cryptographic algorithms, is so weak to a newly refined attack
 that it may be broken by real-world hackers in the next three months, an international team of
 researchers warned Thursday.
SHA1 has long been considered theoretically broken, and all major browsers had already planned to
 stop accepting SHA1-based signatures starting in January 2017. Now, researchers with Centrum
 Wiskunde & Informatica in the Netherlands, Inria in France, and Nanyang Technological University in
 Singapore have released a paper that argues real-world attacks that compromise the algorithm will be
 possible well before the cut-off date. The results of real-world forgeries could be catastrophic since the
 researchers estimate SHA1 now underpins more than 28 percent of existing digital certificates.
Hashing it out
SHA1 is what's known as a cryptographic hash function. Like all hash functions, it takes a collection of
 text, computer code, or other message input and generates a long string of letters and numbers that
 serve as a cryptographic fingerprint for that message. Even a tiny change, such as the addition or
 deletion of a single comma in a 5,000-word e-mail, will cause a vastly different hash to be produced.
 Like all fingerprints, the resulting hash is useful only as long as it's unique. The moment two different
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 message inputs produce the same hash, the so-called collision can open the door to signature
 forgeries that can be disastrous for the security of banking transactions, software downloads, and
 website communications.
A series of attacks on MD5, a hashing algorithm that's much
 more collision-prone than SHA1, provides a glimpse at the
 dire results of collision attacks. The Flame espionage
 malware, which the US and Israel are reported to have
 unleashed to spy on sensitive Iranian networks, wielded
 such a collision attack to hijack Microsoft's Windows Update
 mechanism so the malicious program could spread from
 computer to computer inside an infected network.
 Separately, in 2008, a team of computer scientists and
 security researchers used the technique to forge a master
 secure sockets layer certificate that could authenticate
 virtually any website of their choosing.
MD5 has since been largely abandoned for use in
 generating digital signatures, although it still remains viable
 in other cases. (Notably, MD5 is also unsuitable for
 cryptographically protecting passwords, but this has nothing
 to do with its susceptibility to collision attacks.) SHA1, by contrast, is considerably more resistant than
 MD5 to collisions, although it too has long been considered vulnerable. In 2012, cryptographers
 warned that the growing advances in computing made real-world collision attacks against SHA1 viable
 by 2018.
The 2012 warning was based on contemporaneous
 estimates from Bruce Schneier that it would cost $700,000
 to perform a full-on collision attack on SHA1 by 2015 and,
 thanks to the ever-advancing speed of computers, just
 $173,000 by 2018. That latter amount, Schneier reasoned,
 was well within the budget of a well-financed criminal
 hacking group. Now, based on research completed last
 month, the international team of researchers believe that
 such an attack could be carried out this year for $75,000 to
 $120,000. The much lower cost is the result of efficiencies
 the researchers discovered in the way graphics cards can
 use a technique known as "boomeranging" to find SHA1
 collisions.
The estimate was based on the researchers' ability to carry
 out a successful collision attack on the SHA1 compression
 function. While not a collision on the actual SHA1 algorithm
 itself, the feat nonetheless invalidates the security proof upholding the algorithm and demonstrated the
 soundness of the new graphics-card technique.
"Our new GPU-based projections are now more accurate and they are significantly below Schneier’s
 estimations," the researchers wrote in their paper. "More worrying, they are theoretically already within
 Schneier’s estimated resources of criminal syndicates as of today, almost two years earlier than
 previously expected, and one year before SHA-1 being marked as unsafe in modern Internet
 browsers. Therefore, we believe that migration from SHA-1 to the secure SHA-2 or SHA-3 hash
 algorithms should be done sooner than previously planned."
The paper noted that the collisions involved in the research are known as identical-prefix collisions, as
 opposed to the significantly more severe and costly chosen-prefix collisions at the heart of Flame's
 attack on Windows Update or the 2008 certificate authority impersonation. Identical-prefix collisions
 still allow signature forgeries, but their capabilities are far less flexible than chosen-prefix collisions.
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Identical-prefix collisions, for example, allow for two different executable files that nonetheless generate
 the same digital signature. They also allow for colliding PDF documents that show different content.
 They also make it possible to generate colliding certificates, but those are only different in the public
 key, and not different in, say, the identities' name, so they can't be easily abused.
Kicking the can
Thursday's research showing SHA1 is weaker than previously thought comes as browser developers
 and certificate authorities are considering a proposal that would extend the permitted issuance of the
 SHA1-based HTTPS certificates by 12 months, that is through the end of 2016 rather than no later
 than January of that year. The proposal argued that some large organizations currently find it hard to
 move to a more secure hashing algorithm for their digital certificates and need the additional year to
 make the transition.
The paper was written by Marc Stevens, Pierre Karpman, and Thomas Peyrin. The new calculations,
 should they be confirmed by the researchers' peers, are likely to provide a strong argument for voting
 no and instead quickly migrating to use of SHA2, which is much more resistant to collisions.
PROMOTED COMMENTS
Vincent294 wrote:
Why are people still using SHA1? (rhetorical question)
Legacy systems that just don't have support for SHA-2. Bazillion of embedded / industrial things run on
 OS'es that don't handle anything never and programming such functionality to the application layer is a
 huge undertaking, not to mention prone to even bigger errors.
edit: And when you have a million euro machine that doesn't get OS updates anymore and your options
 are either "running it as it is" or buying a huge project from your system provider, many choose not to
 do anything while still connecting this machine to their corporate network.
Or if you have 10 000 boxes (electricity network control, weather stations, whatnot) distributed around a
 country that run on something like Windows CE or some other ancient OS, you are easily in trouble
 because upgrades are far from easy.
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 Seems to me that based on Bruce Schneier's cost-to-crack estimate, SHA1 should already have been
 considered broken since at least 2012. $700k might have priced criminals out of the market, but it must
 be well within the budgets of state-funded operations in Russia, China and pretty much every
 developed nation on Earth.
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Vincent294 wrote:
Why are people still using SHA1? (rhetorical question)
Well, the short answer is exactly what @tmt stated, but there are other non-lazy decisions with the
 biggest being infrastructure costs. Typically, the more resistant a crypto function is, the more compute
 needed per use and this can quickly become a non-trivial amount.
In 2001, we *had* to use SHA1 with our VPN because the mobile devices of the day would literally
 overheat maintaining the tunnel. The interesting thing is that as we roll compute out to more and more
 things, many of these systems are incredibly small and possibly running on very limited power, so
 using strong crypto is again challenging.
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This challenge also impacts the backend, when we moved to stronger crypto on our data center hosts in
 2006, it took about 30% more hardware to process the same number of transactions. In our case, 30%
 actually cascaded into facility costs because we blew through our planned growth projections and had
 to invest in building, power and cooling to normalize the curve...it was a 7 figure impact...just changing
 the crypto function.
Finally, there is a User Experience issue with cryptographically secured files. Files just keep getting
 bigger and the overhead of encrypting and decrypting them can soar with multi-gig files and once again
 mobile comes into the equation because of the high compute cost. For our less sensitive but not public
 materials, we returned to SHA1 because mobile devices and use the SHA2 family for only the most
 sensitive material.
One last note, we did some testing last year with the SHA3 family versus SHA2 and it will be the same
 ballgame all over again and with the move to encryption everywhere, the costs are just going to
 continue to grow.
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Vincent294 wrote:
Why are people still using SHA1? (rhetorical question)
To add to what others said, CloudFlare has a good detailed analysis on the situation as it pertains to
 certificates: https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare- ... tificates/
A little snippet of interest:
Quote:
Sites that have tried to upgrade to SHA-2 have seen a backlash due to browser incompatibility. In
 July, mozilla.org upgraded their site to use a SHA-2 certificate. In doing so they lost around 145,000
 Firefox downloads per week due to browser incompatibility. Even google.com (as of November 10,
 2014) continues to use SHA-1 for compatibility reasons, despite the company’s push to deprecate
 SHA-1 in Chrome.
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